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Summary
Background Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health providers to 
improve quality of care. Evidence on whether these programmes reduce or exacerbate disparities in health care is 
scarce. In this study, we aimed to assess socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health teams under 
Brazil’s National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ).
Methods For this longitudinal study, we analysed data on the quality of care delivered by family health teams 
participating in PMAQ over three rounds of implementation: round 1 (November, 2011, to March, 2013), round 2 
(April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 (October, 2015, to December, 2019). The primary outcome was the 
percentage of the maximum performance score obtainable by family health teams (the PMAQ score), based on several 
hundred (ranging from 598 to 914) indicators of health-care delivery. Using census data on household income of local 
areas, we examined the PMAQ score by income ventile. We used ordinary least squares regressions to examine the 
association between PMAQ scores and the income of each local area across implementation rounds, and we did an 
analysis of variance to assess geographical variation in PMAQ score.
Findings Of the 40 361 family health teams that were registered as ever participating in PMAQ, we included 
13 934 teams that participated in the three rounds of PMAQ in our analysis. These teams were located in 11 472 census 
areas and served approximately 48 million people. The mean PMAQ score was 61·0% (median 61·8, IQR 55·3–67·9) 
in round 1, 55·3% (median 56·0, IQR 47·6–63·4) in round 2, and 61·6% (median 62·7, IQR 54·4–69·9) in round 3. 
In round 1, we observed a positive socioeconomic gradient, with the mean PMAQ score ranging from 56·6% in the 
poorest group to 64·1% in the richest group. Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance increased by 
7·1 percentage points for the poorest group and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest group (p<0·0001), 
with the gap between richest and poorest narrowing from 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5) to –0·4 
percentage points over the same period (–1·6 to 0·8).
Interpretation Existing income inequalities in the delivery of primary health care were eliminated during the three 
rounds of PMAQ, plausibly due to a design feature of PMAQ that adjusted financial payments for socioeconomic 
inequalities. However, there remains an important policy agenda in Brazil to address the large inequities in health.
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Introduction
Primary health care is the linchpin of any health system 
but has long been neglected.1 The Astana Declaration 
2018 sought to build momentum around a revitalised 
vision for primary health care.2 If political will is to turn 
into effective action, it is crucial that lessons are learned 
from country experience. Brazil has made substantial 
progress towards achieving universal health coverage, 
with the creation of a unified health system in 1990 
(Sistema Único de Saúde).3 Over the past two decades, 
Brazil has invested heavily in primary health care, 
implementing innovative pro grammes at scale. The most 
high profile of these is the Family Health Strategy, the 
expansion of which is associated with reductions in 
mortality alongside reductions in racial inequalities in 
mortality.4–7 In 2011, Brazil launched a national pay-for-
performance (P4P) programme as part of its effort to 
strengthen primary health care through increased 
funding and improved organisational arrangements.
Health systems across the world have introduced P4P 
programmes to incentivise health providers to improve 
quality, use of care, and efficiency. Most of these 
programmes have focused on primary health care. 
Evaluations of P4P typically report average effects on 
these outcomes,8 with insufficient regard for the 
distribution of these effects. However, it is important to 
understand whether P4P programmes increase or reduce 
socioeconomic inequalities in health care. On one hand, 
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P4P could exacerbate existing inequalities if primary care 
providers serving richer populations are better able to 
respond to the financial incentives. On the other, P4P 
could reduce inequalities if health providers serving 
poorer areas face larger potential rewards—either because 
they have greater scope for improvement or because the 
programme itself is designed to address inequalities.9,10 
The distributional effects of P4P across health-care 
providers or local areas remains unclear, with most of the 
limited evidence coming from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework for general practices in the UK.11–14
Brazil’s National Programme for Improving Primary 
Care Access and Quality (Programa Nacional de Melhoria 
do Acesso e da Qualidade da Atenção Básica [PMAQ]) was 
introduced in 2011. The aim of PMAQ was to improve 
access to and quality of primary care. The programme 
was explicitly designed, in its first 4 years, to address 
inequalities by adjusting the financial rewards given to 
family health teams (primary care providers) by 
differences in socioeconomic status between munici-
palities. PMAQ was one of the largest P4P programmes 
in the world, with about 40 000 family health teams 
participating and an expenditure of US$1·5 billion 
(R$8·6 billion) since its inception.15 Although literature 
on PMAQ is growing, previous studies have been limited 
to cross-sectional analyses of PMAQ at one point in 
time or to a narrow focus on specific outcomes, health 
conditions, or individual states.16–19
In this study, we aimed to examine socioeconomic 
inequalities in the quality of care delivered by family 
health teams in successive rounds of PMAQ over the 
period 2011–19. We used programme data on the 
performance of family health teams nationwide, locating 
each team in a census area to establish the socioeconomic 
status of the catchment population. The primary analysis 




PMAQ was a federal programme that made financial 
payments to municipalities based on the performance of 
family health teams (appendix 2 pp 1–2). These teams are 
interdisciplinary, acting as the first point of primary health 
care in Brazil for a catchment population of about 
3450 people per team. Each family health team is attached 
to a health facility and comprises at least one physician, 
nurse, nurse assistant, and full-time community health 
worker. As the decentralised administrative health 
authorities in Brazil, municipalities had autonomy in 
deciding how PMAQ funds were spent (consistent with 
budgetary rules based on federal laws). Although PMAQ 
funds had to be spent on health care, municipalities 
were not obligated to pass on funds as rewards to 
family health teams. PMAQ was implemented over 
three cycles: round 1 (November, 2011, to March 2013), 
round 2 (April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 
(October, 2015, to December, 2019). Participation in PMAQ 
was voluntary, with the proportion of municipalities opting 
into the programme increasing over time (71% in round 1, 
91% in round 2, and 96% in round 3).16 Each round began 
with an assessment of the performance of family health 
teams, which determined the monthly payments made for 
the subsequent 2–3-year period of the round.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed for articles investigating inequalities in the 
performance of providers participating in pay-for-performance 
(P4P) schemes, published from Jan 1, 1990, to May 29, 2020. 
The search strategy included terms related to P4P and 
inequalities: “(pay for performance OR P4P OR performance 
based financing OR results based financing OR performance 
based pay OR results based pay OR performance based 
contracting OR results based contracting) AND (inequ* OR equit* 
OR equality OR socio-economic OR socioeconomic OR disparity 
OR discrepancy OR fair* OR discrim*)”. We identified six studies, 
including one systematic review, that met our inclusion criteria. 
The majority of studies focused on the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework in the UK, showing that socioeconomic inequalities 
in clinical quality and other performance measures in the first 
year of the programme narrowed over time, as practices in the 
most deprived areas improved more than those in more affluent 
areas. There was only one study from a low-income setting. 
A study of P4P in Tanzania found that performance was initially 
higher among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these 
inequalities declined over time.
Added value of this study
To our knowledge, few studies exist that have examined 
inequalities in the performance of primary care providers under 
P4P in low-income and middle-income countries. We examined 
socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health 
teams under Brazil’s National Programme for Improving 
Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We found that, 
initially, modest inequalities occurred in the delivery of primary 
health care on the basis of local area income, which were 
eliminated over successive rounds of PMAQ implementation. 
This was potentially due to a design feature that adjusted 
financial payments for socioeconomic inequalities.
Implications of all the available evidence
Existing evidence suggests that socioeconomic inequalities in 
the performance of primary care providers under P4P decreases 
over time—although a causal link is not established in the 
literature. The extent to which this is the case varies by setting. 
More evidence is needed on how P4P incentive design can be 
used to reduce existing socioeconomic inequalities within the 
health system.
See Online for appendix 2
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PMAQ incentivised hundreds of indicators (660 in 
round 3), some of which have changed across rounds 
(table 1). Indicators included those relating to structural 
quality of care (eg, availability of drugs and equipment), 
processes of care (eg, content of antenatal care and 
treatment completion rates), outcomes (eg, patient 
satisfaction, birthweight of children, and prevalence of 
chronic disease), utilisation of health care (eg, patient 
volume), and management processes (eg, proportion of 
appointments that are scheduled).20–22 PMAQ indicators 
were classified into three categories according to how 
they were measured: through self-assessment, routine 
monitoring, or external evaluation.
For each indicator, a target was specified alongside the 
number of points awarded if the target was reached.20–22 
To generate the PMAQ score for a family health team, 
the number of points achieved was divided by the 
number of points available in each of the three categories, 
and a weighted average was taken across the categories 
and multiplied by 100 (table 1). On the basis of the PMAQ 
score, each participating family health team was placed 
into a performance group that reflected the monthly 
financial reward. The amount of money each municipality 
received was the sum of the specific rewards of family 
health teams. In the first two rounds of PMAQ, an 
adjustment was made for socioeconomic inequality: 
municipalities in the country were divided into six 
socioeconomic bands, and performance groups were 
defined with reference to the distribution of PMAQ 
scores within each socioeconomic band. In round 3 of 
PMAQ, no adjustment was done for socioeconomic 
inequality, and performance groups were based solely on 
absolute PMAQ scores.
Data sources
We drew on four sources of data. First, to capture team 
performance, we obtained the PMAQ scores of all family 
health teams from the Ministry of Health. The scores 
were based on data from the national routine health 
information system and data collected as part of the 
external evaluation, in which university-led survey teams 
visited every family health team. Second, to capture 
structural quality of care and basic characteristics of 
health facilities (to which family health teams are 
attached), we used survey data from the three rounds 
of the PMAQ external evaluation. Third, we used the 
2010 Brazilian Population Census to measure the 
socioeconomic status of households in each census area 
(small geographical areas with roughly 5000 residents). 
The census also provided information on the geographical 
boundaries of each census sector (ie, the census area 
polygons). Finally, to identify the location of health 
facilities (to which family health teams are attached), we 
used their geographical coordinates (longi tude and 
latitude) from the PMAQ external evaluation (round 3), 
supplemented by a health facility census done by the 
Ministry of Health in 2011.23
Measures
Our primary measure of performance was the PMAQ 
score, calculated by the Ministry of Health, which we 
regard as a broad proxy for quality of care. The PMAQ 
Round 1 (2011–13) Round 2 (2013–15) Round 3 (2015–19)
Indicators of performance
Self-evaluation: FHTs reflect on their own performance 1 indicator (10% weight) 1 indicator (10% weight) 1 indicator (10% weight)
Monitoring: routine health management information system data on 
service utilisation and health outcomes submitted by FHT
24 indicators (20% weight) 20 indicators (20% weight) 11 indicators (30% weight)
External evaluation: data on quality of care, patient satisfaction, service 
utilisation, and management quality, collected via health-facility visits 
by external evaluators
573 indicators (70% weight) 893 indicators (70% weight) 648 indicators (60% weight)
Financial reward system
Inequality adjustment Yes Yes No
Performance groups 4 groups based on PMAQ score 
relative to performance of other teams 
within same socioeconomic band*
4 groups based on PMAQ score 
relative to performance of other teams 
within same socioeconomic band*
5 groups based on absolute 
PMAQ score†
Financial reward per FHT, R$ per month
Worst 1700 1700 879
Worse 1700 1700 1758
Middle NA NA 4394
Better 5100 5100 7909
Best 8500 8500 8788
For the self-evaluation, teams received full points if they submitted the questionnaire, regardless of whether they assessed their own performance as being at a high or low level. The exchange rate was 
R$1=US$0·597 in 2011, R$1=US$0·491 in 2013, and R$1=US$0·379 in 2015. FHT=family health team. NA=not applicable. PMAQ=National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality. *Groups 
based on score >1 SD lower than mean (group 1), <1 SD lower than mean (group 2), <1 SD higher than mean (group 3), and >1 SD higher than mean (group 4). †Groups based on score 0–39 (group 1), 
40–59 (group 2), 60–69 (group 3), 70–79 (group 4), and 80–100 (group 5). 
Table 1: Indicators and financial rewards in the design of PMAQ
Articles
e334 www.thelancet.com/lancetgh   Vol 9   March 2021
score ranged from 0 to 100, with 0 representing a family 
health team with the lowest possible score and 100 repre-
senting a team with the highest possible score on all 
indicators. The score was interpreted as the percentage 
of the maximum score obtainable by a family health 
team. As previously mentioned, the set of indicators and 
formula used to calculate the PMAQ scores differed 
between rounds, leaving open the possibility that results 
could be an artifact of changes in measurement. We 
therefore developed a second measure of perfor mance, 
based on a common set of indicators from each PMAQ 
round. These indicators captured the availability of 
92 drugs, 23 items of equipment, and 22 consumables 
and diagnostic tests (appendix 2 p 2). This structural 
quality of care index was defined as the percentage of 
items that were available in each facility on the day of the 
external assessment visit.
We measured the socioeconomic status of each local 
area as the average monthly household income in each 
census sector (appendix 2 p 5). Using their geographical 
coordinates, we located family health teams within the 
polygon of their census area, allowing us to link the 
PMAQ score of family health teams to the mean income 
of households in their location. We also developed 
a broader measure of socioeconomic status, referred 
to as a vulnerability index, by combining census 
information on household income, literacy, and ethnic 
composition. Covariates included the proportion of the 
population younger than 5 years in each census area, 
the proportion of the population older than 50 years in 
each census area, the type of health facility to which the 
family health team was attached (health post, health 
centre, or other), and the number of clinical staff 
working at the facility.
Statistical analysis
We analysed the PMAQ scores at the level of family 
health team. Unless specified, the analyses focused on 
family health teams that took part in all three rounds of 
PMAQ to avoid selection issues.
We first examined whether the PMAQ scores of 
family health teams were associated with the 
socioeconomic status of their local area (census sector). 
We grouped family health teams into ventiles (20 groups 
of equal size, with 697 family health teams in each 
group) on the basis of the census area income and 
plotted the mean PMAQ score in each ventile. We used 
a t test to calculate 95% CIs for the difference in the 
mean PMAQ scores between the poorest and richest 
areas. Tests of significance were based on a two-sided 
test. We regressed the PMAQ score on mean income of 
the census area, controlling for potential confounders 
(census area demographics and facility characteristics), 
using ordinary least squares regressions. We adjusted 
SEs for clustering by census level. We checked the 
sensitivity of our results using the structural quality of 
care index as a secondary measure of performance, 
with the vulnerability index as an alternative measure 
of socioeconomic status, and by including municipality-
fixed effects in the regressions.
Finally, we examined geographical variation in PMAQ 
scores and did an analysis of variance to understand the 
extent to which states and municipalities explained 
variation in PMAQ scores. To visualise geographical 
variation in PMAQ scores, we mapped the data on all 
family health teams in each round using inverse distance 
weighting to interpolate values between team locations. 
We converted the measure of PMAQ performance into a 
Z score (by normalising to mean 0 and SD 1) because the 
scaling varied in each round. Analyses were done in 
Stata 16.1 SE and QGIS 3.10.10.
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. All authors had full access to all the data in the 
study. The corresponding author, as well as TP-J, JOMB, 
ENdS, and JB, had final responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication.
Sample
Family health teams (n=13 934)
PMAQ score round 1
Mean (SD) 61·0 (9·9)
Median (IQR) 61·8 (55·3–67·9)
PMAQ score round 2
Mean (SD) 55·3 (11·7)
Median (IQR) 56·0 (47·6–63·4)
PMAQ score round 3
Mean (SD) 61·6 (12·6)
Median (IQR) 62·7 (54·4–69·9)
Facilities (n=11 750)
Health post 2345 (20%)
Health centre 8832 (75%)
Other 573 (5%)
Total clinical staff 
Mean (SD) 15·9 (9·5)
Median (IQR) 13·0 (11·0–17·0)
Census areas (n=11 472)
Monthly household income, in thousands (R$)
Mean (SD) 1·47 (0·82)
Median (IQR) 1·32 (0·9–1·82)
Percentage of census population younger than 5 years
Mean (SD) 7·3% (2·0)
Median (IQR) 7·1% (5·9–8·5)
Percentage of census population older than 50 years
Mean (SD) 19·7% (6·4)
Median (IQR) 19·1% (15·1–24·0)
Data are n (%), mean (SD), or median (IQR). PMAQ=National Programme for 
Improving Primary Care Access and Quality.
Table 2:  Sample description
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Results
Between November, 2011, and December, 2019, 
40 361 family health teams were registered as partici-
pating in PMAQ and had their performance assessed in 
at least one round (17 482 in round 1, 30 523 in round 2, 
and 38 865 in round 3). Of these, 15 663 (38·8%) family 
health teams took part in all three rounds of the 
programme. Among these teams, 14 923 (95·3%) received 
a PMAQ score by the Ministry of Health (teams that did 
not submit all relevant data or meet basic requirements 
did not receive a score). Our analytical sample comprised 
13 934 (93·4%) of 14 923 family health teams for which we 
had complete information on local area income and 
demographics and facility characteristics. These family 
health teams were located in 11 472 census areas, serving 
approximately 48 million people (appendix 2 p 6).
The mean PMAQ score—the percentage of the 
maximum score obtainable—was 61·0% (median 61·8, 
IQR 55·3–67·9) in round 1, 55·3% (56·0, 47·6–63·4) in 
round 2, and 61·6% (62·7, 54·4–69·9) in round 3 
(table 2). The monthly household income across census 
areas containing the study family health teams was mean 
R$1470 (US$878) and median R$1320 (US$788).
We assessed the mean PMAQ score in each 
round across 20 income groups, ranked from poorest (1) 
to richest (20; figure 1). At the time of the round 1 
assessment, we observed a positive socioeconomic 
gradient, whereby family health teams in richer areas 
achieved higher PMAQ scores than those in poorer 
areas. This gap was modest: the mean PMAQ score 
ranged from 56·6% in the poorest group (lowest ventile) 
to 64·1% in the richest group (highest ventile), with a 
difference of 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5). 
By round 3, we observed no discernible socioeconomic 
gradient: the mean PMAQ score ranged from 63·7% in 
the poorest group to 63·3% in the richest group, with a 
Figure 1: PMAQ score by ventile of local area household income
Each graph shows the mean PMAQ score in 20 income groups (ventiles) with 697 family health teams in each group. Income groups are ranked from poorest (1) to 
richest (20). Mean monthly household income is $520 (US$310) in ventile 1, R$919 (US$549) in ventile 5, R$1357 (US$810) in ventile 10, R$1849 (US$1103) in 
ventile 15 and R$4039 (US$2409) in ventile 20. Exchange rate is for the year 2011. PMAQ=National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality.
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Difference (round 3–round 1)Round 3  (2015–19)Round 2  (2013– 15)Round 1  (2011–13)
Round 1 (2011–13) Round 2 (2013–15) Round 3 (2015–19) Difference (round 3–round 1)
Coefficient (95% CI) p value Coefficient (95% CI) p value Coefficient (95% CI) p value Coefficient (95% CI) p value
Monthly household 
income, in thousands (R$)
1·59 (1·31 to 1·86) <0·0001 0·63 (0·36 to 0·90) <0·0001 –0·21 (–0·51 to 0·10) 0·19 –1·79 (–2·18 to –1·40) <0·0001
Proportion of census 











Proportion of census 
population older than 
50 years 
–9·7 (–13·92 to –5·49) <0·0001 4·71 (–0·11 to 9·52) 0·055 1·35 (–3·94 to 6·65) 0·62 11·06 (5·01 to 17·10) 0·0003
Facility type*
Health centre 1·1 (0·63 to 1·56) <0·0001 0·43 (–0·11 to 0·98) 0·12 0·65 (0·05 to 1·25) 0·035 –0·45 (–1·11 to 0·21) 0·18
Other 1·79 (0·84 to 2·75) 0·0002 0·24 (–0·83 to 1·32) 0·66 0·75 (–0·41 to 1·90) 0·21 –1·05 (–2·28 to 0·19) 0·096
Total staff in facility 0·09 (0·07 to 0·11) <0·0001 0·07 (0·05 to 0·09) <0·0001 0·01 (–0·02 to 0·03) 0·60 –0·09 (–0·12 to –0·06) <0·0001
Observations (teams)† 13 934 ·· 13 934 ·· 13 934 ·· 13 934 ··
R² 0·06 ·· 0·02 ·· <0·01 ·· 0·03 ··
All models show results from ordinary least squares regressions. PMAQ=National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality. *The reference group for facility type is health posts. †Observations 
(teams) are clustered by census sector. 
Table 3: Association between PMAQ score and census area income
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difference of –0·4 percentage points (95% CI –1·6 to 0·8). 
Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance 
increased by 7·1 percentage points for the poorest group 
and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest 
group (p<0·0001). The pattern of results was similar 
when we used a structural quality of care index as an 
alternative measure of family health team performance 
(appendix 2 p 7). As with the PMAQ score, the 
socioeconomic gradient became less steep over time, 
although a positive relationship between structural 
quality and local area income remained in round 3.
We used regression analyses to examine the 
relationship between PMAQ performance and local area 
income, controlling for characteristics of the health 
facility to which the family health team was attached and 
the local population (table 3). In round 1, teams located 
in poorer areas performed significantly worse than those 
in richer areas. A higher monthly household income of 
R$1000 (US$180) was associated with a 1·59 percentage 
point (95% CI 1·31–1·86; p<0·0001) higher PMAQ 
score. The association between PMAQ performance and 
income was weaker in round 2 and no longer significant 
in round 3. The change in the PMAQ score was 
negatively associated with income, confirming that 
the socioeconomic gradient became flatter over time 
(table 3).
We obtained qualitatively similar results when we ran 
regressions with the structural quality index as the 
dependent variable, although the flattening of the 
socioeconomic gradient over time was less pronounced 
than with the PMAQ score (appendix 2 p 12). The results 
were not sensitive to the use of the full sample of family 
health teams rather than the panel (appendix 2 p 13) and 
our vulnerability index based on income, literacy, and 
ethnic composition rather than income alone (appendix 2 
p 14). Regressions with municipality-fixed effects showed 
a significant association between income and PMAQ 
performance in the three rounds, which was small in 
magnitude (appendix 2 p 15).
We assessed geographical variation in PMAQ 
performance for each round (figure 2). At the time of 
assessment in round 1, before bonus payments were 
awarded, family health teams in the more disadvantaged 
northern region had lower PMAQ scores than those in 
the wealthier southern region. In subsequent rounds, 
the geographical variation in performance changed: 
family health teams in the north and northeastern 
regions were no longer performing as poorly compared 
with the rest of the country as they were in the first 
round, whereas teams in the southern region and 
concentrated clusters of teams in the northern region 
started to perform less well compared with those in other 
parts of the country. These changes over time in the 
geographical distribution of the PMAQ scores are most 
clearly seen in the fourth map which shows the change 
in the score between round 1 and 3 (figure 2).
The analysis of variance revealed that states accounted 
for little of the variation in PMAQ scores (appendix 2 
p 10). Municipalities tended to account for the majority of 
the variation, suggesting that municipality-level factors 
played an important role in determining family health 
team performance. The remaining variation in PMAQ 
scores was due to differences between family health 
teams within the same municipality, accounting for 
between 28–46% of the total variation. Between rounds 
of PMAQ, the variation between states accounted for a 
decreasing share of total variation, whereas variation 
within states and within municipalities accounted for an 
increasing share.
Discussion
We investigated socioeconomic inequalities in the 
performance of family health teams that have 
participated in Brazil’s national P4P programme since 
its introduction in 2011. Our analysis yielded three key 
results. First, we found that, in round 1, local area 
income was associated with better performance of family 
health teams throughout the income distribution. The 
strength of this relationship was modest, and these data 
most likely reflect pre-existing inequalities before PMAQ 
started, because data collection in round 1 was done 
Figure 2: Geographical variation in PMAQ performance
Red tones indicate lower Z scores (worse quality) or a decrease in the PMAQ score across rounds and green tones 
indicate higher Z scores (better quality) or an increase in the PMAQ score across rounds. PMAQ=National 
Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality.
Round 1 (2011–13) Round 2 (2013–15)
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before the disbursement of PMAQ funds to munici-
palities. Previous studies have documented income-
related inequality in health care in Brazil, generally at 
one point in time.24–26 However, they focused on measures 
of health and utilisation, whereas we report on 
inequalities in the quality of primary care teams on the 
basis of a composite score generated from indicators of 
utilisation, structural quality, process of care, health 
outcomes, and managerial quality.
A second key result was that income inequality in the 
PMAQ score decreased over time, such that no 
relationship was found in the third round of programme 
implementation. The PMAQ score of family health 
teams in the bottom 5% of the local area income 
distribution improved over the three rounds, whereas 
those in the top 5% had no improvement. These results 
are in line with findings from a few comparable studies 
in other countries. Evidence from the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework for general practices in the UK 
shows that achievement across 48 indicators of clinical 
activity was initially skewed towards less deprived areas, 
but that this pro-rich bias was reduced over the first 
3 years of the programme.13 A similar pattern of results 
was also found in Tanzania.27 A plausible explanation for 
the narrowing in the socioeconomic gap in PMAQ 
performance relates to the design of the scheme. 
Financial payments within PMAQ were adjusted for 
socioeconomic differences between municipalities in the 
first two rounds. This meant that poorer municipalities 
received higher rewards than they would otherwise have 
done that, if invested in primary care services, could be 
expected to reduce income-related inequalities in PMAQ 
performance. An alternative explanation that PMAQ led 
to a better distribution of resources to teams within 
municipalities—for example, by better targeting of 
under-performing teams in poorer areas—was not 
supported by the results from the regressions with 
municipality-fixed effects.
Our third key result was that, despite the modest (or 
absence of) income-related inequality, considerable 
geographical variation in PMAQ scores still occurred. 
Specifically, municipalities accounted for roughly half 
of the variation in PMAQ scores, suggesting that 
municipality factors are important determinants of 
family health team performance. Given the decentralised 
health system in Brazil and the fact that municipalities 
can raise and spend their own tax revenues, this is 
perhaps unsurprising. Municipalities have considerable 
autonomy in the implementation of health policy and are 
the recipient of PMAQ funds, with the authority to decide 
how money is spent. Such an interpretation is consistent 
with findings from a study of the Family Health Strategy 
in Brazil, which found that the programme was more 
effective in reducing mortality in municipalities with 
stronger health governance.28
An important consideration when interpreting the 
results is the extent to which patterns in the data reflect 
inequities in the provision of primary care. Equity is 
concerned with fairness. If more disadvantaged 
communities have greater health needs, socioeconomic 
equality in the performance of family health teams, as 
observed in the third round of PMAQ, would hide what 
most people would agree is an unfair distribution of 
health-care provision. Several studies have found that 
health-care provision in Brazil is inequitable, because 
households with low socioeconomic status and high 
health-care needs often have much less access to care 
than households with higher socioeconomic status and 
lower health-care needs.29–32 Although we documented a 
reduction in inequality in the quality of service delivery, 
there still remains an important policy agenda in Brazil 
to address the large inequities in health.
This study has several strengths. We used newly 
available data on primary care performance for all family 
health teams participating in PMAQ. Additionally, we 
were able to link teams to a fine-grained measure of 
socioeconomic status at the census-sector level. Using 
a coarser measure would not have allowed us to capture 
the considerable income heterogeneity between neigh-
bourhoods within municipalities. Finally, we were able to 
track the same facilities at three different points in time, 
allowing us to examine how the association between 
team performance and the socioeconomic status of each 
local area changed over time.
The study has several limitations. First, our main 
outcome of interest, the PMAQ score, has not been 
validated as a measure of quality and whether it is a 
predictor of health outcomes is unknown. By contrast, 
process quality indicators in some other P4P 
programmes, such as the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework in the UK, are closely linked to evidence on 
clinical effectiveness. However, the PMAQ score is the 
Brazilian Government’s official measure of performance, 
was developed through a deliberate process with wide 
consultation, and was used to determine financial 
rewards in the programme. Second, some of the 
indicators used to generate the PMAQ score changed 
across rounds. Therefore, in principle, changes in the 
level and distributions of the score over time could have 
been an artifact of its measurement. Although we cannot 
rule out this possibility, it is reassuring that results were 
broadly similar when we used a structural quality of care 
index based on a common set of indicators over time. 
Third, we used a relatively crude measure of income, 
captured in the census through a few questions, rather 
than a detailed consumption and expenditure question-
naire. Nonetheless, results were robust to the use of our 
vulnerability index, a broader measure of socioeconomic 
status. Fourth, in linking family health teams to income 
data of their local area, we implicitly assumed that the 
household income of the census area in which a family 
health team was located reflected that of its catchment 
area, which might have extended beyond the census area. 
Fifth, although we used a measure of structural quality of 
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care as a robustness check, such measures might not 
reflect the quality of clinical care actually received by 
patients. Sixth, when examining variation in PMAQ 
scores at different levels, an unknown share of the 
variation at the family health team level might be 
attributable to measurement error, possibly arising from 
within-observer variation (difference in scores by the 
same fieldworker assessing the same facility twice) or 
between-observer variation (difference in scores by two 
fieldworkers assessing the same facility). Finally, our 
analysis focused on the 13 934 family health teams that 
participated in all rounds of PMAQ to address potential 
selection issues. We urge caution in generalising the 
findings beyond the analytical sample (which is probably 
not representative of all PMAQ teams), although we note 
that the findings remained very similar when we used 
the full sample.
This study makes an important contribution to the 
literature on the distributional consequences of P4P 
schemes. Our results suggest that, within one of the 
largest P4P schemes in the world, socioeconomic 
inequalities in the performance of primary care providers 
decreased over the course of the programme. This was 
potentially due to a design feature that adjusted financial 
payments for socioeconomic inequalities. Further 
research is needed on the distributional consequences of 
P4P schemes in different settings, particularly in low-
income and middle-income countries, and for schemes 
with different incentive designs.
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